The last years have witnessed tremendous developments in the field of curve based cryptography. First proposed in 1985 by Koblitz and Miller, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) slowly proved itself to be a valid alternative to RSA. Later, also hyperelliptic curves have been added to the arsenal of cryptographic primitives. Today curve based cryptography is a well established technology. In this survey we shall first very broadly review its development, and we shall then move to a survey of recent results dealing specifically with Koblitz curves.
Introduction
This paper serves two purposes: to explain from a historical perspective why elliptic and hyperelliptic curves are a good choice for cryptography, and to review some recent results about the performance of a specific class of elliptic curves, Koblitz curves, as an example of the dramatic developments that characterize the whole field.
We begin with the situation of cryptography ( § 2) and of elliptic curves ( § 3) before the cryptographic applications of elliptic curves were envisioned. We then move to the early development of curve based cryptography ( § 4), and how it established itself a viable alternative to RSA and to ElGamal systems ( § 5). The second part ( § 6) describes recent new scalar multiplication methods for Koblitz curves.
Cryptography Until Elliptic Curves
Before 1975, the problem of establishing a secret key by communicating over an unsecured channel had no publicly known solution: a secret key had to be transmitted beforehand by other means.
In 1975 Diffie and Hellman [16] proposed a very elegant solution. Let G be a cyclic group with generator g, both publicly known. Two users Alice and Bob want to establish a secret key known only to them. Alice chooses a secret integer a and sends the element a · g to Bob. Similarly, Bob chooses a secret integer b, and sends b · g to Alice. Alice then computes a(b · g) = ab · g, Bob computes b(a·g) = ab·g. The secret key is then (derived from) κ = ab·g. We say that Alice and Bob established the secret key κ.
To decipher the communication an eavesdropper must compute κ solely from G, g, a · g and b · g. This is the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDHP). If the parameters G and g are chosen to make the CDHP intractable, then the key κ is a secret only known to Alice and Bob.
Diffie and Hellman suggested to use the multiplicative group G of a finite field and a primitive element α of the field for g. A necessary, but not always sufficient, condition for the CDHP to be intractable is that the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in G be hard. Given h ∈ G = g , the DLP consists in determining an integer a such that h = a · g, which is called the discrete logarithm of h to the base of g. Diffie and Hellman in fact mentioned the idea of designing cryptosystems around the DLP in finite fields, and one such cryptosystem was proposed by ElGamal [18] in 1985. They also introduced the concept of public key cryptosystem, whereby a message sent, say, by Bob to Alice, can be encrypted using a public key that Alice has made available to everyone, but can only be deciphered by Alice using her own secret key. The first important public key cryptosystem, RSA [49] , was introduced in 1978.
As other systems, such as Knapsack-based systems, were successfully attacked, RSA quickly took the lead, but alternatives have been proposed at a steady pace: In the 29 years since the introduction of RSA, cryptosystems based on elliptic [34, 45] and hyperelliptic [35] curves, multivariate quadratic equations [42] , polynomial factorization [31] , as well as many others have been proposed. Many of these cryptosystems hold their own speed or bandwidth advantages over RSA. Standards regulate, for example, the use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [21, 32] and of NTRU [15] . Cryptographic hardware for some of these systems has already hit the market. In the meantime, the RSA system has been shown to be weaker than initially believed. Still, RSA has remained unchallenged among the public key cryptosystems in terms of dissemination. The most important and successful alternative to RSA so far is provided by Elliptic Curves, especially in view of NSA's recent important endorsements: the acquisition of a special license on Certicom's elliptic curve-related patent portfolio and the inclusion of these curves in the Suite B [46] of recommended algorithms.
Elliptic Curves Before Cryptography
In layman's terms the subject of elliptic curves can be roughly described as the study of the solutions to equations
where the polynomial x 3 +ax 2 +b has no repeated roots. The equation (1) is said to be in Weierstrass form. The points on elliptic curves forms a group, and the group law can be expressed by explicit formulas. Since the DLP on these groups is in general a hard problem, they are natural candidates for cryptographic applications. Because of their structure, elliptic curves have important connections to number theory -such as to factorization of integers [41] , which in turn is another connection to cryptography! Elliptic integrals (related to elliptic curves) of the form r x, p(x) dx, where the polynomial p(x) has degree three or four and has no repeated roots, had been studied in 1655 by J. Wallis. In 1694 J. Bernoulli studied elliptic curves to determine of the length of arcs of a lemniscate. Many types of Diophantine equations, such as Pell equations or the problem of finding integers expressible as the sum of two rational cubes, lead to the problem of finding torsion points on suitable elliptic curves. A generalization of Ritt's second theorem [48] leads to a Pell equation in polynomials and thus to torsion points on elliptic curves [10] .
Elliptic curves enjoy connections to topology, modular forms, zeta functions and analysis. They played a fundamental role in A. Wiles' recent proof of Fermat's Last Theorem, via a connection first seen by Y. Hellegouarch and G. Frey, and then proved by K. Ribet.
G. Frey also played an important role in the development of the cryptographic uses of elliptic curves, in particular of their security aspects.
The Early Years and the RSA Juggernaut
In 1985 V. Miller [45] and N. Koblitz [34] proposed to design cryptosystems around the DLP in the group of rational points of an elliptic curve over a finite field. This marked the beginning of ECC. It was soon noticed that while ECC offered greater potential security it was slow compared to RSA. In fact, the security of RSA relies on the difficulty of factoring a product of two large prime, and at that time algorithms for integer factorization were less efficient than those in use today. Hence RSA could use much smaller parameters than those it uses today, with better performance.
Certicom Corp., founded in 1985 by S. Vanstone, has been one of the first companies to seriously consider the applications of ECC. Working together with the University of Waterloo, Canada, Certicom played an important role in all kinds of ECC research. The performance of ECC has been improved by a few orders of magnitude in the subsequent years, also thanks to the contributions made by Certicom.
At the same time, few computational problems have seen successes as spectacular as those in integer factorization. 1024-bit RSA keys are the next target. Several hardware designs have been proposed to factor them, such as the TWINKLE [51] ("The Weizmann Institute Key Locating Engine") sieving device, TWIRL [52] , ("The Weizmann Institute Relation Locator"), Mesh-based Sieving [26] and the SHARK [23] device. SHARK might be realizable for 1 million dollars to factor 1024 bit RSA moduli in one year.
A Blossoming Field
In 1987, shortly after having proposed the use of elliptic curves, Koblitz [35] suggested the Jacobians of hyperelliptic curves (HEC) of higher genus.
On November 3-4, 1997 the first ECC Workshop was held in Waterloo. Around the same time the research groups of C. Paar at the Worchester Polytechnic Institute and of C. K. Koc at the Ohio State University made serious advancements in software and hardware implementations of ECC. They also initiated the Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES, now an IACR workshop), that became an ideal venue to present practical developments in curve based cryptography.
HECC have also been enjoying increasing attention in recent years. They have long been considered as not competitive with ECC because of the difficulty of constructing suitable curves and of their poor performance with respect to ECC [53] . But, in the subsequent years also this view changed. Firstly, it is now possible to efficiently construct genus 2 and 3 HEC whose divisor class group has almost prime order of cryptographic relevance. For curves over prime fields, a genus 2 analogue of Schoof's point counting algorithm can be used: The first version [24] was too slow, but several improvements, in particular [25] made it possible to count points on curves which are sufficiently large. Another technique is the complex multiplication method [43, 55] . For small characteristic, T. Satoh [50] proposed a fast point counting algorithm for elliptic curves, later improved and extended in several directions, including HEC [33, 39, 44] .
Secondly, the performance of the HEC group operations has been considerably improved. For genus 2, from the first explicit formulae by R. Harley [30] we arrived to T. Lange's monumental work [38] . For genus 3, see for instance the formulae by J. Pelzl [47] . Thorough comparisons and new, improved formulae can be found in [20] and [9] .
In Europe, Germany lead the research on curve cryptography. G. Frey was one of the leading proponents of a DFG Graduate School "Mathematical and Engineering Method for Secure Data Transmission" that fostered the development of ECC and HECC. Weng's [55] Thesis on the complex multiplication method, and Lange's [37] Thesis on hyperelliptic curves were only a few of the important works written under Frey's supervision. This Graduate School was followed by the EU-funded project AREHCC (Advanced Research in Elliptic and Hyperelliptic Curve Cryptography). This european network connected universities and corporations. It produced an important corpus of knowledge, resources and patents. Among these results we mention the first investigation on countermeasures against side channel attacks on hyperelliptic cryptosystems [1] , formulae for computing on genus 2 curves [38] and, following the research on EC performance by the Waterloo group [28] , performance assessments [2] for HEC.
After the foundation of the Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security (HGI) in Bochum, the Ruhr-University of Bochum, situated just 20 kilometers far from Essen in the small area of Germany known as Ruhrgebiet, became another important node in the development of these new technologies. The appointment of C. Paar in Bochum lead to a good synergy with Essen.
Cooperation between the researchers in the Ruhrgebiet and in the Waterloo region has always been intense. For instance, the first ECC Workshops have been held in alternating years in Essen and Waterloo.
In the United Kingdom, N. Smart's research group in Bristol is a very important protagonist of the research in elliptic curve cryptography.
Many developments also take place inside the European Network of Excellence ECRYPT, encompassing 23 academic and 9 industrial partners. Coordinator is the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, founder alongside the Ecole Normale Supérieure (Paris) and the Ruhr-University Bochum.
Several books now cover the field [4, 13, 14, 29] .
Security
The security of a curve-based cryptosystem depends on the hardness of the DLP in the Jacobian Variety of the underlying algebraic curve. So far no subexponential algorithm for solving the DLP on elliptic and hyperelliptic curves of genus at most 4 was found; For curves defined over a fixed field and large, increasing genus the complexity of solving the discrete logarithm becomes subexponential in the group order [19] by using index calculus methods, whereas for fixed genus and increasing field size the complexity of the best methods is still exponential but with a lower exponent than Pollard's methods for genus at least three.
On the other hand the best algorithms for solving the factorization problem and the DLP in finite fields are subexponential. Therefore, to achieve a security increase equivalent to doubling the RSA key size, one needs to add only a few bits to an EC group. For example, according to [40] the security of 1323 bit RSA (or of a 137 bits subgroup of a 1024 bit finite field) is attained by an EC over a 157 bit field and with a group of prime order. For that same level of security, the field would have 79 bits for a HEC of genus two, 59 bits for genus three and 53 bits for genus four (the Jacobian of the curve must have a subgroup of prime order of at least 157 bits); In comparison, the security of 2048 bits RSA is (roughly) achieved by 200-bits curve groups, and that of 3072 bits RSA by 240-bits curve groups [17] .
Systems based on curves of genus between 2 and 4 also offer much shorter key sizes compared to RSA for comparable security, genus 2 offering the same security as EC, and genus 3,resp. 4 requiring 12.5%, resp. 33.3% more bits -for instance, 180 and 213 bits instead of 160 for ECC).
There are thus obvious bandwidth and performance advantages in using curve based systems, in particular as security requirements increase.
Scalar Multiplication
In this Section we shall describe improvements to the scalar multiplication i.e. the computation of n · P for an integer n and an element P of the considered group, in Koblitz curves.
In order to compute n·P on an elliptic curve the first algorithm that had been used was the double-and-add algorithm, based on the binary expansion ℓ i=0 n i 2 i ∈ N, n i = 0 or 1 of the scalar n. This is given as Algorithm 1. Put λ(n) = log 2 n. This method requires, on average, λ(n) doublings and λ(n)/2 additions in the group G.
It can be generalised to any group G endowed with a suitable group Algorithm 1. Double-and-add method for scalar multiplication
INPUT: An element P of a group (G, +, 0), n = P ℓ i=0 n i 2 i ∈ N, n i = 0 or 1.
OUTPUT: The element n · P ∈ G.
1.
return Q automorphism φ satisfying a monic minimal polynomial over the rational integers. φ is identified with a root of the polynomial and then the scalars are written to the base of φ. Then the doubling is replaced in Algorithm 1 by an application of φ. Various digit sets can be used, as we shall see in the following example.
Koblitz Curves and Digit Sets
Consider Koblitz curves [36] defined by the equation
over the field F 2 n . The Frobenius endomorphism τ , is the map induced on E a (F 2 n ) by the Frobenius automorphism of the field extension F 2 n /F 2 , that maps field elements to their squares. Set µ = (−1) 1−a . It is known [54] that τ permutes the points P ∈ E a (F 2 n ), and (τ 2 + 2)P = µτ (P ). Identify τ with a root of τ 2 − µτ + 2 = 0. If we write an integer z as ℓ i=0 z i τ i , where the digits z i belong to a suitably defined digit set D, then we can compute zP as ℓ i=0 z i τ i (P ) via a Horner scheme. The resulting variant of Algorithm 1 [36, 54] is called "τ -and-add" method. Since a Frobenius operation is much faster than a group doubling, scalar multiplication on Koblitz curves is more efficient than on generic elliptic curves.
The elements dP for all d ∈ D must be computed before the Horner scheme, the cost being roughly proportional to the size of the digit set. Larger digit sets permit the construction of representations ℓ i=0 z i τ i with fewer non-zero coefficients and thus fewer group additions in the Horner scheme. Optimal performance is attained upon balancing digit set size and number of non-zero coefficients.
A reduced residue set modulo τ w is a set of representatives of each residue class of Z[τ ] modulo τ w which is coprime to τ . Solinas [54] constructs a digit set adjoining the zero to a reduced residue set modulo τ w whose elements have minimal norm in their classes. This digit set is uniquely determined [8] . Solinas' recoding enjoys the width-w non-adjacent property
and is called the τ -adic width-w non-adjacent form (or τ -w-NAF for short). Every integer admits a unique τ -w-NAF. Of course, we can construct other digit sets without requiring the digits to have minimal norm. In this case it is possible that not all integers admit finite expansions. Digit sets that always guarantee a finite expansion are called w-NADS (width w non adjacent digit sets). They have been first characterised in [8] . Particularly interesting is the following w-NADS:
In [8] it is also shown how to use D with large values of w and still obtaining finite recodings for all inputs. Before showing how to use this family of digit sets, we need to briefly talk about point halving.
Point Halving on Koblitz Curves and Sublinear Scalar Multiplication
For any given point P on an EC defined over a field of characteristic two, point halving consists in computing a point Q such that 2Q = P . According to [22] , halving is about two times faster than doubling. Thus, developing the scalar to the base of 1/2 modulo the group order one can devise a halveand-add scalar multiplication method which is faster than the double-andadd method for generic elliptic curves. It is not useful for Koblitz curves because halving is slower than a Frobenius operation.
In [3] a halving is inserted in the "τ -and-add" method to speed up Koblitz curve scalar multiplication. A refined version of this approach [6, 7] , is equivalent to using the digit set {0, ±1, ±τ} modulo τ 3 . For n ∈ Z[τ ] we compute zP using an expansion y = ℓ i=0 y i τ i of the integer y :=τ 2 w−2 −1 z where the digits y i belong to the digit set of Theorem 6.1. Write y i = ǫ iτ ki with ǫ i ∈ {0, ±1} and define
y (k)τ k and it is easy to verify that zP =τ
The last expression is evaluated by a Horner scheme in τ 2 , i.e. by repeated applications of τ and a point halving (since 2 = ττ ) interleaved with additions of y (0) P , y (1) P , etc. The elements y (k) P are computed by a τ -and-add loop as usual, i.e. by a second, nested Horner scheme. We can thus compute any scalar multiple of a base point with most of the speed advantages of a large digit set but without the disadvantage of having to store many multiples of the base point first. Under reasonable assumptions [8] :
Theorem 6.2. There exists a sublinear scalar multiplication algorithm on Koblitz Curves with constant input-dependent memory consumption.
Sublinear refers to the number of group operations, and "constant memory consumption" refers to the number of points we need to store during the computation -each one taking O(n) bits. A similar result can be found in [5] . Usual windowed methods have, of course, similar time complexity but use storage for 2 w−2 − 1 points [54] and thus O(n2 w ) = O(n 2 / log n) bits of memory. Now a comparison of the scalar multiplication methods using this idea with classical methods for field sizes actually used in standards. The second and third columns report speed and memory consumption of a simple scalar multiplication on Koblitz curves using affine coordinates and the τ -NAF, i.e. a τ -adic recoding using the digit set {0, ±1} and a width-2 non-adjacency property. The next column pair refers to a state-of-the art implementation of a windowed τ -adic recoding with mixed coordinates and optimal window width. The last two columns refers to the method based on the techniques reviewed here. "Cost" means cost of a full scalar multiplication expressed in field multiplications (cf. [8] ), and "Mem" refers to the number of points we need to store.
The newest methods reduce memory footprint and improves performance with respect to the previous state of the art techniques. In particular, speed improvements ranging form 2 to more than 10 in a few years, as seen in the table above, are in fact not uncommon in curve-based cryptography.
The paper [9] shows similar improvements for other classes of curves, such as families genus 3 and 4 hyperelliptic Jacobians. The state of the art in scalar multiplication raw speed on specific elliptic and genus 2 curves over prime fields is currently found in [11, 12] .
